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Abstract
Recently Nigeria was a granted debt relief package by the Paris Club totalling us$18 
billion or
60 percent oithe total deit owed it by Nigeiia. ThL Country is expected to pay the balance 
of 40
percer-rt or US$12 billion beginninfi wltn us$o billion arrears in september 2005 and 
the
remaining US$6 billion throigh deit buy-Uack at market vaiue' There is optimism that 
the
savings iud" fro* debt service commitments and the prospects of debt freedom would tfigger
a spurt of prosperity that would propel Nigeria to economic growth and development' 
It is the
contention of this work that tiris optimism is misplaced, as the fundamental condition 
for
economic development, which is eionomic iustice, has not been addressed' 
The injustice of
consigning Nigeria and other Third world countries to the periphery of the global economic
systeir wilere they produce primary commodities whose terms of trade are precarious 
is
respousible for their underdeveloprnent The continued retention of the present international
eco'ro*ic system with detrimentaf division of iabour is antithetical to real development' 
Unless
this is redressed no amount of debt relief will transform Nigeria and Third World cottntries 
to
genuine develoPment.
paymentsystem / externa-debt. htm)'
The succeeding civilian
administration headed by President
Shagari was not able to steer the economy
to iustainability. Like the preceding
military administrations, it frittered away
the enormous earnings from appreciated
international oil prices between 7979 and
1981. In 1980 the total external debt of
Nigeria was US$8.9 biilion. This figure
rose steadily and scandalously to US$29'0
biilion tn1992;it got to an ail-time high of
US$34in 1995 and currently stands at
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, Nigeria has been
labouring under the excruciating weight
of debt overhang. The journeY to
indebtedness started in 7977 when the
Gen. Obasanjo regime contracted the first
jumbo ioan of N600mi11ion (US$1billion)
and foilowed uP with a second iumbo
loan of N734 million (US$1.456 billion) in
7978. Pockets of indiscriminate
borrowings by both Federal and State
governments later comPounded the
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US$35.9 billion (CBN Annual Report
2004:137).
As the debt profile increased so was
t1-re debt servlce requirement. While the
cumulative clebt service disbtirsements by
Nigeria as at 1985 totalled US $1.5 billion,
these rose to US $21.9 biilion in 1995
l-.efore totalling US $35 biliion in 2003
(Adetunji 2004:1)
Since the early 1980s Nigeria had
been clamouring for debt relief. The
clamour came to a head in 1986 r,t hen the
miiitary junta of Gen. Babangida
introciuced tl-re Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP). SAP failed to impact
positively on the Nigerian economy. Toyo
criticises SAP and argrles that the
ineffectiveness of SAP was principally as
a result of its incongruent theoreticai
foundation - neoclassicism (Toyo
2002:527).
Recently the Paris Club granted 18
n,orld's poorest countries 100 percent debt
.uvrite-off worth about US$40 billion and
also extended to Nigeria a debt relief
package of US$18 billion dollars out of
US$30 billion owed it. Optimism is upbeat
that with this development Nigeria would
be able to extricate itself from the
exploitative shackles associated with debt
peonage and be on the path of econornic
development.
Butis this optimismwell founded? In
other words, can debt relief alone without
the re-ordering of the international
economic system guarantee economic
growth and development? Africa and
indeed Nigeria occllpy the fringes of the
international economic system where their
assigned contribution to the international
division of labour is the production of
primary commodities. Also, apart from
the constraint of dependence on primary
commodities as major export earners,
African economies have the added
constraint of monocultulal economic base.
The Nigerian economy is dependent on a
single export commodity - oil. The
implication of this is that African
economies, including Nigerian economy,
face unstable export market with
deteriorating terms of tracie. This scenario
is disadvantageous to Africa. President
i\4useveni of Uganda appreciates this
when he queried, "the r.alLre of the coffee
market is US$70 billion. We, coffee
producing countries, get US$S billion,
who takes the remaining US$55 billion?"
(Cobb Jr 2003). It is within this context
that we examine the recent debt relief
granted Nigeria by the Paris Club and the
contention that the resources that it would
free would propei the corlntry to
economic development.
Nigeria's Debt Crisis: From Under-
borrowing to Debt Peonage
Within the Third World enclave, debt
burden has remained the albatross that
has stunted its growth and development.
The earlier euphoria accompanying
politicai independence in the early 1960's,
when most of the Third World countries
especially those in Africa got their
independence, gave way to despondence
and crisis within a decade. The decline in
the development of these countries started
gradually in the 1970s and culminated
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into crisis proportions in the 1980s.
Nigeria enjoveci a relatively high
iiving standard in the 1960s and
continued to do so even in the early 1970s
with a basket of primary commodities
covering groundnut, cocoa/ rubber, palm
oil, coal, timber and crude oil. From one of
its primary export commodities - oil,
Nigeria earned unprecedented revenue
orving to international oil price increases
in the 1973/74 periods. With this
enormous earning and with the
dwindling accruals from other primary
export commodities Nigeria inexorably
moved to monoculturalism. Nigeria
dissipated its enormous earnings from oii
and u,ithin a few years plunged into debt.
A combination of factors ranging from
poor economic policies, corrupt leadership
to deteriorating externai terms of trade
contributed in eroding the Nigerian
economy (Trends in Developing
Economies 7995:26)
It was not only Nigeria that found
itself in the Western-splrn web of debt in
the late 1970s. Other countries were
sr-rcked into the eddy of the debt
whirlwind which assumed a Tsunami
status in the 1980s. The causes of the debt
crisis which hit the Third World in the
1980s have been variously attributed to
the oil shock of 1.973-74; recession in the
developed world which led to the
implementation of anti-inflationary
policies; rapid rise in the rate of
borrowing and of lending, inadequate
economic policies and the food crisis that
also began in 1973 (Spero 1977:148-149:
De Vries 1987:208: Payer 1987:7-16). TFre
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skewed international economic system is
also identified as a contributory factor in
the emergence and persistence of the debt
crisis of the Third World (Nweke 1985:1-
19; Onimod e 1989 :234; T oy o 2002:527).
Between 1973 and 1976, Nigeria was
in top form economicaily. This healthy
economic outlook was as a result of the
quadrupling of crude oi1 prices in the
international market. Nigeria's earnings
underwent exponential growth from a
few hundred million Naira to N4.733
billion in 7975 and N15 billion in 1980.
Sadly, the military regimes in Nigeria,
Cowon (1966-1975), Mohammed (7975-
1976) and Obasanjo (1976-1,979) did not
invest in weaith-creating ventures but
engendered a generation of parasitic elites
through mindless spending. Nwankwo
(1,986:19) corroborates it: "huge sumswere
simply used to buy patronage, reward
political debts, acquire loyalties or
acquiescence, and in many cases blatant
bribery". Examples abound of this
unproductive orgy of spending.In 1974,
without proper economic analysis, the
Federal Covernment of Nigeria massively
adjusted the minimum wage and as a
result over-bloated its recurrent
expenditure to unsustainable level.
Commenting on this period of Nigeria's
affluence and the wasted opportunity to
develop, Kalu (1987:774) observes that
"even the scum of Western Europe seized
the country as businessmen. Anything
could be bought and sold". The erroneous
notion of development held by these
regimes led them to engage in massive
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import-dependent industries and satisfy
the gror.r,ing tastes of the emergent noaeoil
riche. Thus emerged the magnificient
flyovers in Lagos, towering skyscrappers,
race courses with rare British and
European flowers and other white
elephant projects. Also, under the false
premise of shorv-casing the tourism
potentials of Nigeria, these regimes
embarkeci on monrlmental voyage of ego-
massaging. The restilt was the hosting of
the first African Festival of Arts and
Cultr-rre (FESTAC) in 1977 and a host of
other events including international trade
fairs and All Africa Games.
Before 1977 Nigeria was classified by
the developed countries as being under-
borrowed. From 7970-7977, the average
external loans of Nigeria did not exceed
N500 million while 78.5 percent of this
amount was from bilateral and
multilateral sources, that is, soft loans on
concessional terms. Within this period,
debt service obligations were within the
means of the country as it averaged N30.4
million (Aluko-Olokun 1989:198-199). But
things changed in 1977.
Gen. Obasanjo, the then Head of
Nigeria's Military government took the
first jumbo loan of N600 million (USg1
billion) in 7977 from the Internationai
Capital Market and followed up with the
second jumbo loan of N734 million
(US$1.456 billion) from the Euro Money
Market. Both loans formed the basis of the
current entrapment of Nigeria and the
complete erosion of its potentials for
growth. Whiie the terms for contracting
the first loan inciuded an interest rate of 1
percent above the London Inter-Bank
Offered Rate (LIBOR) and repayrnent
spread over 8 years, including a grace
period of 3 years, the conditions for the
second loan were the same as the first
except that the interest rate was L percent
for the first 4 years and 11l8 percent for the
last four years (Aluko-Olokun 1.989;798 -
1ee).
The fall-out from the huge earnings
from crude oil and unwarranted loans
was the expansion of importation bills. As
Olukoshi (7990: 84) acquiesces:
the huge amount of
petrodollars accruing to the state
led to an unprecedented
expansion in public expenditure.
From N8.258 biilion in 1975, state
expenditure rose dramatically to
N13.281 billior-r in 7979 and
N23.695 billion in 1980.
This astronomical rise in import costs was
sustainable only as long as the state
continued to earn sufficient foreign
exchange to finance the imports. In other
words once there was a shortfall in the
earnings of the country, a major crisis was
bound to emerge in the economy.
Nigerian economy was to be thrown into
such a crisis as a result of a number of
factors ranging from oil glut, boycott of
Nigeria's oil, decline in oil output and
lower prices.
The civilian regime that succeeded the
Obasanjo military junta saw the recovery
of the international price of oii from
US$14.9 per barrel in 7978 to US$33 per
barrel and all time high of US$44.4 in
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1980. This favourable economic climate
saw the resurgence of unprecedented
profligacy. By 1981 Nigeria,s imports
averaged some N1.2 billion , *o.th, u
figure that was maintained into the first
quarter of 1982. Also the Federal
Government drew up an ambitious 4th
National Development plan (i9g1-1985) of
N28 billion with unrealistic projection of
?:LTbd at USg36 per barrel and rising to
US$50 per barrel before the end of the
plan period. Needless to sa/r these
projections felt flat. By 1982, the price of
oil fell as a result of oil glut and Nigeria,s
earnings could not match its importi. This
led to a serious balance of payment crisis.
Shagari was nowhere solving Nigeria,s
economic problems when he was toppled
ii ., military pursch led by Gen
Muhammadu Buhari on 3l.tDecember
1.983.
The high point in the debt debacle of
Nigeria was when Gen. Ibrahim
Babangida introduced the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAp) in 19g6.
Themajorfeatures of the Babangida,s SAp
were the same standard IMF/World Bank
conditionalities. According to Osagie
(1989:226); Gana (1990:97f, the mist
important aspect of Babangida,s SAp was
SFEM (Second Tier Foreign Exchange
Market) which was introduced on 22""d
September 1986. The benefits touted to be
derivable from SFEM turned out to be a
hyperbole. The cost of SFEM was
enormously detrimental to the Nigerian
economy. Nigeria's Naira had a free fall
in the SFEM and instead of 60 percent
devaluation originally planned; ttre Naira
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was devalued by 500 percent. Osagie
(7989 : 227) opinesinut tnt unprecedentecl
devaluation "raised the costs of imported
inputs & consequently prices of finished
products in circumstances of declining
real incomes & nominal money stock....,,
The effect of the devaluaiion of the
Naira on the debt profile of Nigeria was
its instant burgeoning. Gana (1990:99)
gives a rough arithmetic of it: given the
value of the Naira then which was 1:4,
that is, one United States Dollar to four
Naira, an external debt of US$10 billion
would require forty billion Naira to
liquidate. And since Nigeria must pav in
dollars, it meant borrowing -or" io poy
both principal and interest. SAp rvorseneci
the Nigerian economy ancl successive
governments have been grappling with
problems spawned by it. Economic and
Statistical Review (1996:7) concurs ancl
avers that since the introduction of SAp in
1986, theNigerian economy has witnessed
many challenging macro economic
qrobl.ems, among which are rapidly
deteriorating value of the Naira, high and
negative rate of interest, high rate of
inflation and fiscal imbalance.
Contrary to Eurocentric views that the
debtburden of the Third World countries,
including Nigeria, is a direct consequence
of inefficiency and misapplicati,on of
loans, evidence abound thaiin adclition to
these factors, Third World countries' debt
overhang is a product of wide_eyecl
economic policies - policies whose aim is
to keep Third World countries at the
periphery of the global economic system.
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stranglehold on the economies of the
Third Worid. Under the Pretext of
proffering panacea for the resuscitation of
the Third World economies (which are in
the throes of debilitating debt burden) a
regime of economic measures were
recommended, chief amongst them being
trade liberalization, withdrawai of
subsidies from social services and
privatization.
Mr. Linus Fernando Jaramillo,
Columbia's representative to the UN
(cited in Offiong 2001:110) comments that
the heavy and unbearabie externai debt
bi"rrden of African countries has made
them net exporters of capital to developed
conntries and multilateral financial
institutions. This contention is indeed
unimpeachable. The deliberateness of
Third Worlcl debt burden is akin to the
peonage system. In the peonage or debt
slavery system, the worker is unable to
use his nominal freedom to ieave the
serr.ice of his employer because the latter
supplies him r,r,,ith credit (for overpriced
goods in the company store) necessary to
sr-rpplement his meagre wages. The aim of
the employer/creditor/merchant is
neither to collect the debt once and for all,
nor to starve the emplovee to death, but
rather to keep the labourer permanently
indentured through his debt to the
employer (Encarta Encyclopaedia
Standard 2A0q.
Since 1985, Nigeria's cumulative debt
service commitment has been on the rise.
In 1985 the cumulative debt service
payments made bv Nigeria was US$1.5
billion. This jumped to US$21.9 billion in
1995 before summing up to US$35 billion
in 2003 for an original loan of not more
than US$13 billion. As at 2004 the total
debt profile of Nigeria was US$35.994
billion with debt service reqttirement of
US$1.756 billion. (Adetunji 2004:1; CBN
Annual Report 2004:138).
Delineating Commodity Trap
Third World countries are enmeshed in
commodity trap. Africa within tl-re milieu
of this trap is held even more tightly than
other continents and is ttnder the danger
of economic asphyxiation. Within the
globai economic system, Africa is
designated as the feeder zot:.e - supplving
raw materials to the developed conntries
and importing finished goods from them.
The very process of colonialism
consolidated this. Nigeria being the
colonial subject of imperial Britain became
the enclarze for the production of timber,
groundnut, cotton, palm oil cocoa, crude
oil and uncountable solid mineral
deposits. To ensure the continr-red flow of
raw materials, Britain had instituted a
number of policies. As Offiong (1980: 102)
has noted, lands were alienated from
Africans and given to Europeans to
establish plantations and also Africans
were forced to plant export crops. This
signalled the dawr-r of imperiaiism which
Brown (cited in Ake 1981: 20) denotes as
"the outward drive of certain peoples to
build empires - both formal colonies and
privileged positions in markets, protected
sources of raw materials and extended
opportunities for profitable employment
of labour". With imperialism, capitalism
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went on rampage in Africa and consigned
it to the periphery of the international
economic system. Imperiaiisrn, which has
mutated into modern globalization, has
had one goal - continuedperipheralisation
of the Third World, although its strategies
had varied. As Ake (1981: 36) notes,
imperiaiism used a combination of
strategies ranging from the creation of
consumerist orientation, stimulation of the
ascendancy of primary production,
stimulation of the growth of a money'
market and capitalist financial institution
to the extension of the scope of market
economy. The effects of all these have
been qummarized by Ake (1981 36 - 37):
The capitalist penetration of African
economic created some fundamental
affinities between the African
economies and that of the colonizing
power. The controlled development
the African economies in the interest
of the metropole, which went along
with the expansion of colonial trade,
meant structural interdependence,
for instance, in the division of labour
between primary production and
manufacture, and in the dependence
of economic growth in the colony c<'l
the metropole's demand for coloniai
imports. . . .The essence of the role of
trade in the integration of African
econornies into the World capitalist
system was that it promoted
complimentarity or interdependence,
albeit an "unequal interdependence"
between the African economies and
the meLropoli tan economies.
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policies of the developed countries
intensify and aggravate the dependenc,rz
and -backwardness of African countries.
For this reason their economies are
characterized by low level of activities in
science and technology, a high level of
economic dependence on foreign
monopolies, a dominant orientation on
exporting raw materials and a large,
alarmingly increasing foreign debt.
The scientific and technological
advancement in the developed countries
1ed to the introduction of synthetic
equivalent of hitherto export earrlers.
Thus the traditional export earners such as
cocoa, palm oil, cotton, and groundnut
saw its market share contracting and
terms of trade worsening. The effect of
this is severe external shocks as a result of
catastrophic fall in real terms of
commodity prices (Cho 1995:91; South
Centre 1996:48-5A).
Currently the Nigerian economy is
monocultural in character. Crude oil
remains the single highest export earner
accounting for over 90 percent of Nigeria's
foreign earnings. The iow-levei of
technology, low productive base, high
interest rate, iack of appropriate economic
policies and elite corruption have made it
piactically impossible to attempt to either
diversify the Nigerian economy or set the
necessary infrastructure for eventual
ascendance to the centre of the global
economic system. The policy
pronouncements of the Obasanjo
administration to diversify the Nigerian
economy and earn money from
manu{acturing, tourism, liquefied natural
1
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gas, scilrd.miner:als and agrictrlf!1le' hav€
Iemained.;,mere p{o}ourpernenfr' firstead
of setting the'nob't"uty infrastructure for
manuf4c-tunrtg; Nigeria recentlY started a
' cassavr .."otrrtion in which it' targets to
get a chunk of the world demand for
irrru..u (as raw materials) es:timated to be
- The current rosy apPea{4ry,u of the
Nigerian econotly is attribtrlabie to th'e
unlreced.e*l{ed increase in the priee of oil
in the international market' The price of
oil has been high for the past three years
and this llreh price has bebTed up the' country's 'fdrei8n reserve. Irtrigeriafs
externa.l i"eserve stood at US$23 billion as
at the end 'of MuY 2005. Thi's is a
considerable increase from US $15'955
billion at the end 2004 and US g7 '467 'B
billion at the end of 2003
(www. cenb ank.or g / ; CBN Annual Report
2004:158). If there is a reversal in the price
of crude oil as it did in the late 1970s, the
same scenario, which derailed the
economy, then would be replicated and
the Nigerian economy would plummet
into the abyss of economic damnation'
That is the fate of monocttltural and
primary commodities-dePendent
economy.
The Paris Club Debt Relief Package for
Nigeria
Debtor countries have basically three
approaches for getting or-rt of the debt
crisis. Nowzad (i 989 : 122:724) ; Akinnifesi
(1990: 777) rdentrfy these as:
(o) Repudiation of debt which entails
refusal to further debt repayment
qbligations;
(bI, Meeting all debt obligations as
and when due; and
(c)' Negotjations with creditors for
the debt to be restructured or
. cancelled.
The first entails that the debtor refuses to
honour his debt repayment obligations' It
is viewed seriously as it could lead to
system collapse. The international
financial community would declare a
debtor-nation, which repudiates its debt,
"irt default". Apart from all further
lending being stopped, its assets all over
the world could be confiscated and
auctioned. One past example of debt
repudiation is that of Peru, where
President Garcia declared that Peru was
unilateraily limiting its debt payments to
10 percent of its export earnings - a de
facto repudiation. This move proved
detrimental to the Peruvian economy/
leaving the countrY isolated from
international financial markets and
eventually leading to a crushing
US$20bi11ion foreign debt (Colgan 2001)
The second oPtion is not feasible.
judging from the fact that debt crisis
simply means inability to meet service
obligations on existing debt, that is,
paying interest and principal in time
(Ayittey 7999), this is no option at all to a
country enmeshed in debt crisis.
The third option involves mutual
discussions on the way out of the debt
logjam and this is where the IMF and
World Bank have been playing active role.
These Bretton Woods institutions under
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certain conditions agree to reschedule
debts whose repayment poses a serious
financial problem. According to Nowzad
(1.989:1.23) rescheduling involves
rearranging the original payments
schedule or timetable of an obligation or
series of obligations.
Early attempts to address the debt
crisis began in the 1980s with debt swaPs
by creditors and with the IMF's Structural
Adjustment Programmes, which were
designed to stabilize and restructure
economies to ensure full payment of the
debt stock. From 1988 on, a range of
measures were enacted to reschedule and
restructure debts through the Paris Club,
an informal forum where creditor
governments review and reschedule debt
payments programmes for poor countries
(Coigan 200i). In September 19BB in
Toronto, the members of the Paris Club
held an economic summit, the outcome of
which was referred to as "Toronto
Terms". This was a menu of options that
could be chosen to reduce official debt in
low-income, debt-distressed countries.
These options included, reduced interest,
very long grace and repayment periods (at
commercial rates) or partiai write-offs of
debt-service obligations during the
consolidation period with the rest
rescheduled at commercial rates and
shorter maturities or a combination of
these options (World Bank Annual Report
7994:9)
An improvement was made on the
19BB Toronto Terms in 1991and was
regarded as "Enhanced Toronto Terms".
It comprised two options providing for
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deeper debt reduction plus non-
concessional options from the old Toronto
terms. Theconcessional options amounted
to 50 percent forgiveness in present value
termr ondebt service payments falling
due'-&rrjn& the consolidati6n period.
EnhancedT(ironto terms also provided f or
a thir* non-concessiorLal" option:
consolid*ion at market rate, with a
repaym6nt feriod of twenty:five years,
including a fourteen-year grace period.
The Naples Terms were animprovement,
which piwide relief up to 67 percent.
Going by the tradition of the Paris
Club, its.announcement on the 30tr'of June
2005 that it was ready to eonsider a
comprehensive debt relief deal for Nigeria
was considered by many as
unprecedented. Kersley, Pettifor and Bush
(2005) have contended that the debt
package granted to Nigeria by the Paris
Club is groundbreaking on three points:
first, the US$18 biliion debt forgiveness
granted Nigeria represents the largest
sum to be written off for any African
country, beating the previous record set in
September 2002 when the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) had US$10
billion debt written off; second, that prior
to the debt reprieve, Nigeria was
ineligible for Paris CIub relief as Nigeria
had no IMF programme in the country
running; and third, that untii recently
Nigeria did not enjoy status (a status
conferred on countries by the Worid Bank
and which deems a country poor enough
to be entitled, for example, to concessional
debt relief).
The debt relief package granted to
1 Aat+t
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Nigeria by the Paris Club amounts to
US$18 billion representing about 60
percent of the debt owed the member
countries of the C1ub. Out of the total debt
burden of US$35 billion, Nigeria owes the
members of the 19-nation-strong Paris
Club about US$30.8 biilion. According to
the debt deai, the country is expected to
pay the balance of 40 percent or US$12
billion begiruring with the payment of
US$6 billion arrears in Septernber 2005
and the remaining US$6 billion through
debt buy-back at market value (Ibe et al
2005:1). The debt relief was based on the
"Naples Terms". The Naples Terms are
equivalent of 67 percent reduction on the
face value of debt and are applied to the
debts of poorest nations. The UK
Chalcellor of the Exchequer, Cordon
Brown, commented that the debt relief
granted to Nigeria, combined with the
debt buy-back, would "mean there is 100
percent debt relief for Nigeria possibly
over the next six months"(BBC News
World Edition 2005).
The debt relief breakthrough has been
attributed to the economic reforms
embarked by the Obasanjo administration
since 2003 and the demonstrated
wiliingness of the administration to take
advantage of the exceptionai revenue
accruing to the country from favourable
international price of crude oil to finance
an exit from the Paris Ciub (BBC News
World Edition 2005). Since 2003 the
Obasanjo government has engaged on a
number of economic reforms outside the
normal IMF economi.c ref orm
prescriptions. The framework for these
reforms is a home-grown package called
NEEDS (Nationai Economic
Empowerment Development Strategy).
Even though Nigerians assembled this
economic reform agenda, yet it is not
different from myriad adjustment
packages previously sponsored by the
IMF.
It is erroneous to assume as Kersley,
Pettifor and Bush (2005) did that since
there was no IMF programme running in
Nigeria that the homegrown reform
package was different from the traditional
IMF prescriptions. NEEDS framework
derives its essential essence from the
neoclassical theoretical formulation and
this is the dominant theoretical
foundation of all IMF prescriptions.
Therefore what we have in Nigeria is akin
to Jacob's voice and Esau's hand. Added
to this, is the fanatical fawning of the
Obasanjo government to meet the various
iMF conditions. In 2002 Nigeria offered to
buy back two billion dollars worth of its
commercial Brady debt in an effort to
restructure its unsustainable debt burden
and improve relations with the IN4F
(www.nige riaftsl / article-B95shtm). And
shortly before the Paris Club relief,
Obasanjo announced in different fora that
he was committed to using the excess
accruals from the oil boom to settle the
country's debts.
Contrary to the view, that the Paris
Club debt relief to Nigeria was
inconsistent with its tradition, there is
evidence that it followed its tradition of
relying on IMF's opinion very strictly.
What is the tradition? Admission to the
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Paris Club for debt relief negotiations,
over the years, was made contingent upon
an IMF programme being in place and a
track record of meeting certain conditions
before a country couldbe deemed eligible'
As Kersley, Pettifor and Bush (2005)have
pointed out, an IMF Programme is
regarded as a seal of approvai of a cor-rntry
and creditors have tended to insist on the
comfort level of having the IMF there as
gate-keepers to any debt concession. The
NEEDS framework even before its
implementation received the tacit
approval of the IN4F and during
implementation it willingiy monitored
reforms of the Nigerian government
under what it calls a sYstem or an
approach of intensified surveillance.
Equally the seal of approval of the World
Bank was stamped on Nigeria shortiy
before the Paris Club's announcement of
debt relief. In the week before the J1'r' of
June 2005 meeting of GB Finance
Ministers, the International Development
Association (IDA) status was quietly
confemed on Nigeria by the World Bank
thus enabling it to be eligible for
consideration under Naples Terms.
Issues in Paris Club Debt Relief,
Commodity Trap and Sustainable
Development
The debt relief granted Nigeria and 18
other countries classified as highly
indebted poor cotlntries (HIPC) accords
with the shift in political and economic
thinking in the developed countries. This
new thinking is geared towards the
consoiidation of the gains of globalization.
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The pervasive poverty in Africa and
terrorist attacks especially the September
11 attacks in the United States and other
pockets of terrorist attacks worldwide are
obviousiy a threat. For this reason the
British Prime Minister Tony Blair through
the Commission for Africa set up the
framework on behalf of the deveioped
countries for the redress of the poverty
that has ravaged and made Africa a living
hel1. The 17-man Commission which has
a large representation of Africans such as
Nigeria's Fola Adeola (founder of
Guaranty Trust Bank PLC), lr4eles Zenawi
(Ethiopian Prime Minister), Dr K. Y.
Amoako (Ghanaian and Executive
Secretary of the Economic Commission for
Africa), Dr William S. I(alema of Uganda,
Trevor Manuel of South Africa and Mrs
Linah Mahohlo (Governor of the Bank of
Botswana) to name a few rePortedlY
consulted widely throughor-rt Africa and
with the African Diaspora before making
its recommendations. Some of the
recommendations call on the Western
leaders to increase aid, cancel debt
completely and repatriate funds stolen by
corrupt leaders, which are currently
stashed away in numbered Western bank
accounts. The recommendations also call
on African leaders to improve governance
and fight corruption, provide free primary
education, improve healthcare, commit
aid money to infrastructural development
and so on (Nworah,2005:82)
According to the G8 Gieneagles
Summit Communiqu6, the GB agreed to
back this plan with a huge scale up in
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Africa by 20L0, increasing it by US$25
biiiion a yer as recommended by the
Commission for Africa. This would be just
part of an overall increase in aid for ali
developing countries of US$50 billion a
year by 2010. Aid should rise to nearly
US$100 billion a year in 2006 and to nearly
US$130 billion in 20t0
(www. gB. gov.uk/G8G1eneag1es2005). The
Cleneagles Summit of the GB also
endorsed the very recent agreement
achieved by Gordon Brown to cancel 100
percent of the remaining debt, which
heavily indebted poor countries owed to
the World Bank, the IMF and the African
Development Bank.
Having successfully dismantled
nationai autonomy and entrenched iron-
cast trans-national and trans-continental
interconnectedness in earlier phases, the
current trajectory of globalization does not
aim at democratizing the internationai
economic system. Far from it, its mandate
is to maintain the status quo by deepening
the dependence of the Third World while
pretending to ameliorate their conditions.
While addressing the UK parliament
recently, Prime Minister Tony Blair had
said that the new G8 package for Africa
was the most detailecl and ambitious
package for Africa ever agreed by the GB.
But there is a condition to be met before
its implementation; Blair identifies it as
"significant improvements in standards of
governance/ transparency and
accountability" (www.pm.gov.uk). If
these three concepts- ,,governance,,,
"transparen cy" and "accountability,, were
to be weighed in the scale of neo
liberalism or viewed from the prism of
neo classical theoretical tradition, what
Blair simply meant and what the new
phase of globalization connotes are the
same thing - further commitment of
African governments to such issues as
deference to market forces, further
dismantling of national barriers restricting
the internationalization of the strategies of
their transnational corporations (TNCs)
and openness to internationai finance
(Tandon 2000 :57 -59 ; Asobie 200 1 :38).
But in spite of the "detailed and
ambitious" nature of the GB Summit
package for Africa it is flawed. It did not
attempt to address the grave injustice
leading to inequality in the internationai
economic system. Rather it emphasized
increase in aid and other sundry
assistance. Yet aid and such assistance of
previous years form the debt of today.
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the former
king and Prime Minister of Cambodia,
lamented that "in accepting their ,aid, we
were injecting ourselves with virus which
poisoned the national biood stream ... it
was an insidious paralysis-type illness
and by the time the symptoms appeared,
it was too late to do much about it. Even
after I cut off aid aitogether, the poison
continued its work. Top-level ,dollar
addicts'in our government were prepared
to commit treason and may be ready to
sabotage my stop-gap measures, in order
to get the doilars flowing again,,(cited in
Payer 1974:104). Aid to the Third World
countries was structured to be self-serving
and it created not economic growth but







but enslavement. (Bentsi-Enchlll 1,999 :19).
With the persistence of the current
structuring of the international economic
system the situation can not change for
the better no matter the volume of aid sent
to Africa. Craig Burnside and David
Dollar in a study, which involved
elaborate statistical analysis, concluded
that foreign aid did promote growth. But
they included a caveat: foreign aid
promoted economic growth as iong as the
recipient government had solid fiscal,
monetary and trade policies in place
(Eviatar 2003). But their conclusion is not
unassailable. William Easterly, Ross
Lavine and David Roodman using the
same methodology, though with up-to-
date and comprehensive data disagreed.
They contend that they did not find that
aid promoted growth in good poiicy
environments (Eviatar 2003).
African economies are characterized
by dependence on cash crops,
monoculturalism and import-substituting
industrialization. They are trapped in the
vicious cycle of primary commodity
production whose prices nose-dive
continuousiy. The vagaries of this position
are such that African countries have no
control over their situation. Because the
primary commodities which African
countries produce are incapable of
absorbing shocks arising from the
interplay of suppiy and demand, the
usuai response to price fall has been an
increase in production. International
commodity prices fe1lin real terms by 45
percent during the 1980s - a historically
unprecedented fall. This gigantic externai
Agaptus Nruozor
shock caused these economies to become
balance of payments constrained (South
Centre1996: 48-50). In order to earn the
same amount or an amount closer to the
pre-shock period, these countries must
produce more. According to World
Development Indicators (2003:181), in
2001 while merchandise accounted for 81
percent of all exports of goods and
commercial services and manufactured
goods 78 percent of merchandise export,
export of primary non-fuel commodities
saw their trade volumes increase, but a
continuing decline in their terms of trade
ieft them with less income.
In spite of the elaborate agenda by
the developed countries to write off the
Third World debt and meet the provisions
of the l\4illennium Development Goals
(it4DGs), the persistence of unwholesome
practices, which sustain the uneven global
economic system, will erode the optimism
for a sustained African development. The
Communiqu6 of the G8 Summit in
Gleneagles recognized trade as a majgr
driver of economic growth but yet did not
evolve a level-playing ground to enable
Third world countries participate. Prime
Minister Tony Blair says, "Iwish we could
have gone further in agreeing specific
measures to increase access for poor
countries to our markets and to eiiminate
the agriculture and export subsidies
which unfairly count against them
(www.pm.gov.uk).
Conclusion
Debtburdenhas remained the single most
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developed world has ensured the
subservience of Nigeria and other Third
World countries. The leverage, which this
indebtedness conferred on the deveioped
countries since the onset of debt crisis in
the 1980s, has effectivelybeen deployed to
contain these economies. Through a
combination of IMF-sponsored
adjustment programmes with a string of
conditionalities, the Nigerian and most
Third World economies came close to the
brink of total collapse. The enormous
contradictions spawned by these
programmes contributed to the
burgeoning of their debt profiles.
The root of Nigeria's debt problem
and indeed other Third Worid countries is
the worsening of terms of trade arising
from their export commodities. The
Nigerian economy starting from the mid-
1970s has been dependent on crude oil.
Therefore fluctr_rations in the prices of this
product greatly affect its economy, ditto to
other Third Wortd countries, which
mainly are dependent on ail manner of
primary commodities.
Debt or no debt, Nigeria and other
Third World countries couid have been on
the path of development had the
international economic system been
founded on justice. There is no justice to
the Third World countries.
It is this injustice that this work has
attempted to expose and in doing so
argues that debt relief without
international economic justice (level_
playing ground in the internationai
economic arena) will not lead to
development. Instead there wili be
inerritable march towards re-enslarzement.
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